In the preceding chapter, we used the doctrine of indistinct intellections to take signifi cant steps toward solving Type-1 NO's, NO's in which the agent is reasonably expected to keep in mind her obligation continuously until TEF. What, though, about Type-2 NO's, cases in which the relevant time lag is long enough such that the agent could not reasonably be expected to keep in mind her obligation continuously until TEF, but short enough such that there is no expectation for her to 'write notes to herself ' or do something along those lines? Is the doctrine of indistinct intellections useful for explaining their culpability?
In this chapter I will demonstrate how it can be so applied by proposing a signifi cant development of Scotus's machinery, a development I will call 'Lingering Indistinct Intellections. ' Moreover, I will show that there are two variations of Type-2 NO's and that my proposal helps explain culpability in both of them. I will end by acknowledging a task similar to that expressed aft er we discussed Type-1 NO's remains. Namely, there will still be a question as to how the agent is to have knowledge of certain relevant descriptions of her action or non-action. Th e answer to this will ultimately come in the chapter on Suárez. Nonetheless, the work done in this chapter will be indispensable for the resolution of Type-2 NO's.
I. Type-2 NO's: Special Challenges Posed
Given the longer time-lag in Type-2 cases, NO's of this type pose some particular challenges not presented by Type-1 cases. Th ese particular challenges, in turn, make Type-2 NO's the most challenging to solve. For ease of exposition, I repeat the basic example of a Type-2 case here.
Sample 2: John arrives at his apartment at 4:30 and, at that time, makes a promise, and is thus morally obligated in some sense, to pick up his friend Des at the airport tonight. He will need to leave at 7:00 in order to do this. Knowing that he has two and a half hours, he begins watching TV. As it turns out, he becomes so engrossed in the show he is watching that he forgets to pick up Des. It is not until 9:00, when Des calls John to ask him where he is, that John realizes he has omitted to fulfi ll his obligation.
We need to fi nd a way to ascribe voluntariness and blameworthiness to John's ignorance, at 7:00, of the fact that it was then time for him to quit watching TV and leave. Th is is especially challenging, for it is diffi cult to specify any point in the example at which John may have done something unacceptable.
It may be suggested that one point in which culpability can ultimately be placed is John's watching TV. Why? It is clear that John did not have present in his mind an intellection of his obligation at 7:00; otherwise, the omission would not be negligent, but rather intentional (since an indistinct intellection implies some awareness on the part of the agent). And since John was watching TV, one can perhaps conclude that this obligation-related intellection is absent (and thus John's ignorance is present) on account of John performing intellectual tunnel vision on what he was watching. In such a case, blameworthiness is traced back to his performance of intellectual tunnel vision.
As it is, this suggestion does not initially carry much weight. Let us posit for sake of argument that John did indeed perform intellectual tunnel vision (hereaft er, 'ITV') and did so at 5:00. Th ere seems to be nothing wrong with his performing ITV at that time. He is ex hypothesi not required to keep the obligation in mind continuously (as in Type-1 cases). Furthermore, he need not have the obligation-related intellection in mind until 7:00, and performing ITV at 5:00 does not necessarily entail that the obligation-related intellection will be absent at 7:00. Th ere thus appears to be no direct incompatibility between performing ITV at 5:00 and recalling or fulfi lling his obligation.
Th e defense for the permissibility of performing ITV just off ered, however, is itself questionable. It may be conceded that performing ITV at 5:00 is not, in and of itself, incompatible with recalling one's obligation at 7:00; only performing ITV at 7:00 would be. However, once ITV is begun, there is no guarantee that one will happen to recall one's obligation. Th erefore, if John is about to perform ITV at 5:00, he has the further obligation to take steps (such as set an alarm) so as to help 'bring him out of tunnel vision, ' so to speak, and remind him of his
